The optimization of the dynamics of combat (optimal distribution of fire over enemy target types) is studied through a sequence of idealized models by use of the mathematical theory of optimal controL The models are for combat over a period of time described by Lanchester-type equations with a choice of tactics available to one side and subject to change with time. The structure of optimal fire distribution policies is discussed with reference to the influence of combatant objectives, termination conditions of the conflict, type of attrition process, and variable attrition-rate coefficients. Implications for intelligence, command and control systems, and human decision making are pointed out. The use of such optimal control models for guiding extensions to differential games is discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper the structure of optimal fire distribution policies is examined for tactical situations described by Lanchester-type equations of warfare. This is done to provide insight into such important questions as
(1) How should fire be distributed over targets? (2) Do target priorities change with time? (3) Does the number of target types affect the optimal distribution of fire?
(4) Do battle termination circumstances affect the optimal allocation policies? (5) How does the nature of the attrition process affect the optimal distribution of fire? (6) How does the uncertainty and confusion of combat affect the optimal distribution rules?
A theory of tactical allocation is developed through the examination of a sequence of simplified models.
These combat models are too simple to be taken literally but should be interpreted as indicating general principles to serve as hypotheses for subsequent computer simulation studies or field experimentation. In 1964 Dolansky [9] noted that the Lanchester theory of combat was insufficiently developed in the area of target selection for combat between heterogeneous forces (optimal controYdifferentia1 games). Even the two references cited by him, Weiss [31] and Isbell and Marlow [14] , have been subsequently extended by this author 1241, [261 Since Dolansky's article, no further examples have been published in the literature except for the ones in Isaacs' book [131 This previous work had never systematically investigated the dependence of optimal tactics upon model form. T = total time for the battle, Tl = maximum possible duration for battle, i.e., T wlr . . ., wn, u = utilities assigned per unit of surviving X I , . . ., Xn, Y forces, respectively, xl, . . . , xnr y = average force strengths; with initial values x;, . . . , x:, yo, 
SOME FIRE DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS
A theory of optimal fire distribution is developed by examining a sequence of problems and then contrasting the structures of the optimal fire distribution policies for these problems. In this manner the effect of the model's form on the optimal policy will be illustrated. Five different fire distribution problems are considered in order to study the effect of the model's form on the structure of the optimal policy by contrasting the solutions to these problems. The problems that are considered are for the optimal distribution of fire of a homogeneous force, denoted as Y, in Lanchester combat against heterogeneous forces, denoted as XI through X,. These problems are summarized in Table I . The effects of the following four factors on the optimal allocation policy may be inferred from this study: number of target types, target-type attrition process, time variations in attrition-rate coefficients, and battle termination conditions.
TABLE I. Summary of Problems Considered to Study Effect of Model Form on Optimal Fire Distribution Policy
Explanation of Symbols Target 
Battle of Prercribed Duration (Two Target Types)
The simplest fire distribution problem is for combat between an X-force of two force types (for example, riflemen and grenadiers) and a homogeneous Y-force (for example, riflemen only). This situation is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 . It is the objective of the Y-force commander to maximize his survivors at the end of battle at time T and minimize those of his opponent (considering weighting factors p , q , and r). This is accomplished through his choice of the fraction of fire, 4, directed at XI.
However, this idealized tactical allocation problem may be studied in two different scenarios: (1) a battle lasting a specified length of time (denoted as TI ) or (2) a battle lasting until one side or the other i8 totally annihilated. Each of these situations will be analyzed separately. Table I .) It is stated in mathematical terms below.
(Problem 1) maximize { ry( T ) -p q ( T ) -qxz (T) } with TI specified,
where all symbols are defined in section 2. above. (3) T=Ti, TI unless, of course, one side or the other is annihilated before TI. To be more precise, the battle terminates under one of the following three conditions:
where T denotes the time at which the battle ends. However, to avoid inessential complications only the special case in which X I (T) > 0, zz( T ) > 0, y ( T ) > 0, and T=TI is considered for the comparisons made in this paper. In other words, those subcases in which a state variable is reduced to zero are not considered.* Thus, it is assumed that the initial force levels are such that no force type is annihilated during this prescribed duration battle. The solution to Problem 1 for the above special case is shown in Table 11 . A derivation of these results is omitted, since Problem 1 may be considered to be a special case of Problem 3 for which a derivation is provided. where I = -R-1'
Discussion of Structure of Optimal Policy
With reference to Table 11 , two characteristics of the optimal allocation policies for this particular
(1) all fire is always concentrated on one target type; (2) the allocation is not (directly) dependent upon the force levels. It will be seen later that when there are more than two target types in this scenario, the solution possesses these same characteristics (even when the attrition rates change over time). Both these characteristics, however, are consequences of the assumed model form.
The first characteristic, concentration of effort on one alternative, is a consequence of the "squarelaw" attrition process for the X-forces. (The attrition of a target type will be referred to as being a "square-law" process when the casualty rate is proportional to the number of enemy firers only and as being a "linear-law** process when it is proportional to the product of the numbers of enemy firers and remaining targets.) It w i l l be shown in section 3.3.2. that this makes the existence of a singular control [15] impossible, and hence the optimal allocation policies are extreme points in the control variable space.
There is, however, a very simple principle which underlies the above mathematical formalities: concentration of effort when constant marginal returns are obtained from the alternatives and the total effort is limited. Constant marginal effect over time per unit of weapon system is a property of the square-law" attrition process; this is readily seen from considering the XI-force attrition (when t$= 1)
4'
--rate of casualties produced per .
unit of Y-force weapon system
Thus there is a constant (or nondiminishing) marginal effect over time. This should be contrasted with the situation for a "linear-law" attrition of the X1-forc.es, rate of casualties produced per .
In this there are diminishing effects over time from allocating a unit of Y-force weapon system against XI, and a division of total effort (i.e., fraction of fire) may be called for. B. Koopman's 1953 article [17] contains an excellent discussion of such principles which underlie such an optimization problem. Presently, these heuristic arguments will be verified in a mathematically precise fashion when a dynamic model, which considers the interaction of forces over time and in which both X-force target types undergo "linear-law*' attrition, is considered. This fundamental difference in the structure of optimal allocation policies based on the nature of target attrition makes the selection of the appropriate attrition process an essential task of analysis. The second characteristic, the optimal allocation not (directly) dependent upon the force levels, is due to the combination of the "square-law" attrition process for the X-force types and the fixed battle length. T. It is seen that for the special case of this prescribed duration battle in which xi(T) > 0, x s ( T ) > 0, and y ( T ) > 0 the optimal distribution of fire depends only on the attrition rates of the various force types and relative weights assigned to surviving force types. This is not surprising, since the adjoint differential equations (see section 3.3.2. below) are independent of the state variables, and the values of the dual variables at the end of battle t = T are independent of force strengths. It is recalled that a dual variable represents the rate of change of the payoff (battle outcome as measured by the value of surviving forces at t = T ) with respect to a particular state variable [2].
It seems appropriate to discuss further the interpretation of the solution shown in A switch in tactics (target priority) is seen to occur for this model only when value is not assigned to
Xl survivors (recall that engagement of XI always yields more "long range return") greater than or equal to in proportion to their destructive capability (kill rate).
The maximum principle may be interpreted as saying that a target type from several alternatives is engaged when such an engagement yields the greatest favorable effect on battle outcome per unit time. It turns out, though, that the evolution of target engagement return is dependent upon the scenario chosen for the study of the problem. This is clearly seen when we examine the "fight-to-the-finish." This is a special case of a terminal control battle (the dombat ends only when the course of battle has been steered to a prescribed end state) and is chosen for mathematical convenience. Target Types) below.
Terminal Control Battle (Two
Problem 2 is a terminal control battle (a "fight-to-the-finish") and is stated in mathematical terms where all symbols are defined in section 2. above.
The stopping rule for this battle is that the conflict terminates at t = T defined by Upon further analysis it has been convenient to consider that there are the following five "target sets"
for Problem 2:
The reader should note that in the above problem statement T is referred to as being undetermined. This is because T is determined by entry to one of the above five target sets. In turn, this depends upon the control used, and hence before an allocation rule is given, it is unspecified. where 6 = a l p / ( a p q ) . The solution for each of these cases is given in [24] . Moreover, these appearingly complex results may be summarized in a particularly simple fashion* (for the nonrestrictive assumption that R > 1, i.e., albl > apb2). When Y wins, he engages XI until depletion before X2. When Y loses, he may switch from firing at XI entirely to firing at X2 entirely before the XI force has been annihilated. This happens in Case (2) (R -VR (R -1) 6 < 1 ) when survivors of force-type Xp are assigned utility in excess of their Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient as compared with force-type XI, and certain relationships hold between initial force strengths. Thus, in contrast to the prescribed duration battle (Problem l), the optimal policy for Problem 2 may depend on initial force levels. 
T). It is convenient to define
From Table I1 it is seen that 1 z+ V z 2 + a * -l a2 b2 l + a
It is assumed that r is a strictly positive quantity. Furthermore, in Problem 2 71 denotes the backwards time at which c$* changes from 0 to 1 (in backwards progression) with X I ( T = T I ) > 0, i.e., the time of a change in the optimal distribution of fire without the annihilation of a target type. In [24] it was shown that
Then, it is easy to show that when 6= alp/(asq) < 1, it follows that T I (Problem 1) < TI (Problem 2)
and in such a case Y fires at X2 for a longer period of time in Problem 2 than in Problem 1. This is stated as Theorem 1.
THEOREM 1: Assume that 6 < 1 and r > 0. Then
By observing (2) and (3) and recalling that q, r > 0, we can see that the theorem follows by showing aT1 aa that -< 0 for 6 < 1. It is readily computed from (1) that
(4)
Now 6 < 1 (recalling the nonrestrictive assumption R > 1) implies that z > 1, so that
since a > 0. From (5) it follows that
which proves that aa < 0 for 6 < 1.
Prescribed Duration Battle with Several Target Types
The first two problems were considered in order to contrast the structures of the optimal allocation policies for different battle termination conditions. Another factor that can be examined is the number of target types. For the prescribed duration battle certain facets which tended to be obscured in the scenario with two target types are brought into sharper focus when n target types are considered.
Problem 3 is a prescribed duration battle against n target types and is stated in mathematical below.
Thus, terms n (Problem 3)
maximize { vy( T) -wixt (7')) with TI specified, 
Optimal Policy in a Special Care
The battle lasts for 0 6 t Q TI unless, of course, one side or the other is annihilated before TI. To be more precise, the battle terminates under one of the following three conditions:
T = T I , where T denotes the time at which the battle ends. However, for the comparisons made in this paper, only the special case in which X I (T) > 0, . . . nn( T ) > 0, y ( T ) > 0 , and T = TI is considered. Thus, as done in section 3.1.1. it is assumed that the initial force levels are such that no force type is annihilated during this prescribed duration battle.
The solution to Problem 3 for the above special case is shown in Table Ill . A derivation of these results is given in the next section. In Table Ill 6i.j denotes the Kronecker delta and is equal to 1 for i = j and zero otherwise. It is seen that the solution to Problem 3 turns out to be a generalization of that to Problem 1. However, certain aspects receive greater emphasis to provide one with a deeper understanding of the phenomena under study. In particlular, two subcases, denoted as Case A and Case B, were considered in the solution to Problem 1 (see Table 11 ). When there are several target types, the generalization of the subcases, which it is convenient to distinguish, is as follows:
Case A, enemy survivors valued in direct proportion to their kill rate against Y-force, Case B, enemy survivors not valued in direct proportion to their kill rate against Y-force. In the first instance, Case A, target priorities keep their same relative ranking over time. If the highest priority target type is exterminated during such a battle, then fire is merely shifted to the next highest priority target. Hence, when one values enemy survivors in proportion to their kill rate against you, i.e., wi=kbi, for i = 1, . . ., n , the optimal tactic is to concentrate all fire on a single target type until it is entirely destroyed. The sole criterion for target selection in this instance is the quantity a h , which may be interpreted to be the rate of destruction of enemy attrition capability for his ith force type (see section 3.1.2). 
NOTES:
(1) 1 is index such that QJbJ=max (albl. . . ., a.6.).
(2) n is index assigned so that anwn= max ( Q I W I .
. . .. Q n W n ) .
at(brwm-bnw1) With reference to Table I11 in Case B it is seen that there may be one or more switches in target priorities if the battle lasts long enough. For example, in subcase (b) of Case B of Table I11 a switch in the optimal tactic of concentrating all fire on one target type occurs, and fire is shifted from target type k to target type n. It will be shown that necessary conditions for fire to be switched from target type k to n are that a k b k > anbn and > %, i.e., fire is shifted from a target type which causes attrition in a geater proportion than the ratio of values placed upon survivors to the target type which yields the greatest direct return at the end of battle. Additionally, in Table I11 explicit expressions are given for "switching times" as well as for the determination of the target type upon which all fire is concentrated.
b k Wn
It should be noted that when n = 2 the results of Table I11 reduce to those given in Table 11 . To see this one sets n = 2 and makes the following identifications: WI in Problem 3 is replaced by p in Problem 1, and w by q.
Development of Optinul Fire Dbtribution Policy
For y > 0 and xi > 0 for i= 1, . . . , n, the Hamiltonian for Problem 3 is given by [8] * (7) where p i ( t ) for i= 1, . . . , n denotes the dual variable corresponding to xi and p n + i ( t ) denotes the dual variable corresponding to y. According to the maximum principle, the optimal control (there is only one 
Sincepn+l(t) >O for 0s t ST, Equation (11) implies that ajbj=akbk, which, in general, is not true.
Hence, there is no singular solution to Problem 3 and +i*(t) is either 0 or 1 (almost everywhere).
Considering (lo), it is easily seen that dpi bi dpn bn'
Substituting (12) into (8), one obtains after some manipulation that the optimal control is determined by Hence, for this problem when one values enemy survivors in direct proportion to their kill rate against you, the optimal tactic is to concentrate all fire on a single target type until it is entirely destroyed. The result (15) is given in Table 111 .
The more complex case in which one does not value enemy survivors in direct proportion to their kill capability (measured by a Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) against you will now be considered.
Since the solution to this problem is developed by working backwards from the end t = T, it is convenient to introduce the "backwards time" variable r defined by r = T-t . It is assumed that the enemy target types have been indexed so that n is the index such that By (8) it is easily seen that By straightforward continuity arguments, it is readily seen that where 71 is the "backwards time" of the first switch in target selection. Giving consideration to (18) and observing that -=--; it is seen that for re[O, 711 one need only consider the following equations from the adjoint system (10)
and it is recalled that (rewriting (12))
The above initial value problem (19) is routinely solved to yield p n ( 7 ) = -w n cosh GT-v & sinh -7.
It will now be determined what conditions are necessary for a change in target selection and the time at which the change occurs, T I . To do this it is convenient to rewrite (13) and (14) as n subject to: 7 c$i= 1, = l where A switch in the optimal distribution of fire occurs at the smallest T for which where i= 1, . . ., n -1 and certain other conditions (to be determined presently) are met. Let k be the index of the target type to which fire is first shifted in "backwards time." Observe that at T = O one has for i= 1, . . ., n -1, since the index n has been defined by (16). Then for T ] < T < 7 2 , where TS is the "backwards time" of the second switch in target selection, one has that 4:(7) = & k , and thus by (22) and (23) the following inequality must hold which may be rearranged to yield
It will now be shown that a necessary condition for fire to be shifted from target type n to target type k when one works backwards from the end is that U k b k > a n b n . The proof is as follows. It will be shown that u k b k C a n b n leads to a con'tradiction. First, consider the special case when a k b k = a n b n . In this case (26) reduces to or But this is a contradiction to (25) which must hold with i = k . In the case when a n b n > U k b k , then using the fact that ( -p n ( 7 ) ) > wn for T > 0, we may write (26) as but this leads to Q k W k > U n W n which is a contradiction to (25) as before.
Thus, u k b k > a n b n and the switch in target selection occurs at (27) so that a second necessary condition is
In other words, all fire is concentrated at earlier (forward) times in the battle on the target type which causes attrition proportionally more than the ratio of values placed on survivors and then is switched later to the target type which yields the greatest direct return at the end of battle.
To recapitulate the above, the target to which fire is first shifted (working backwards from the end of battle) has index k determined by where ( 
29)
The time of switch, 71, of fire to the kth target type is determined by the equation which may be solved to yield the expression for 71 given in Table 111 .
The general pattern of when and to which target types fire is shifted as one works backwards from the end of battle does not emerge until one has considered the second shift in target selection. Since -this is dependent upon the evolution of target worth, the backwards integration of the adjoint system of differential equations must be further considered. From above, one has that where 7 2 is the "backwards time" of the second switch in target selection. Giving consideration to (31), it is seen that for T E [ T~, 7 2 1 one needs only to consider the following equations from the adjoint system (10) 9 = -b k P n + t with P k (7 = 71) = -v k , (32) where (33) Equation (33) follows from the fact that by (8) and (9) at 7'71 we have which may be combined with (27), (28), and (29) to yield the desired result. Equation (34) is readily deduced by observing that according to (19) a "square law" relates the dual variables Pn(7) and P n + l (~) for 0 d 7 G T~ whence follows (34) by use of (27), (29) , and (32). It should be noted that all the dual variables may be expressed in terms of P k ( 7 ) (let n = k in (12)) (37) Again, the Equations (32) are routinely solved to yield for T E [ T~, 7 2 1 Subsequent arguments are now similar to those given for the first switch in tactics. Let j be the index of the target type to which fire is shifted secondly in "backwards time." Then, it may be shown by similar arguments to above that necessary conditions for fire to be shifted to the jth target type are that and However, more insight may be gained by rewriting (40) as It also seems appropriate to point out the military interpretation of the ratio -. br Recall that Thus, it is seen that as one progresses backwards from the end of battle that fire is always shifted to target types with larger ratios of kill rate per unit of weapon system per unit value of survivors.
Using an argument similar to the one used to develop (28) and (29) for the first shift in fire, it may be shown that the target to which fire is shifted secondly (working backwards from the end of battle) has index j determined by where (
43)
The time of switch, 7 2 , of fire to the jth target type is determined by the transcendental equation which may be solved to yield the expression for 7 2 given in Table 111 . Further shifts in fire follow the pattern established above.
Discurrion of Structure of Optimal Policy
Considering Table 111 , it is seen that the optimal allocation policy for Problem 3 has the same structure as that for Problem 1 with just two target types:
(1) fire is always concentrated on one target type, (2) the allocation is not directly dependent upon the force levels. The addition of more target types has not changed the nature of the problem: its explicit solution is a generalization of that with two X-force target types.
It is of interest to ask whether the optimal tactic will always be to concentrate fire on only one target type (bang-bang optimal control). The answer to this question turns out to be "no" as consideration of Problem 5 with a "linear-law" attrition process for the X-force target types will show. The reader is referred to section 3.1.2. for a further heuristic discussion of the structure of the optimal policy for the distribution of fire over target types which undergo attrition at a rate proportional to only the number of firers.
Some Special Cases of Time Dependent Attrition-Rate Coefficients
In the previous idealizations of combat that have been considered above, it has been assumed that all the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients were constant. In reality, such a coefficient depends upon numerous factors some of which are as follows: hit probabilities, weapon system projectile-target lethality characteristics, rates of fire, rate of target acquisition. These factors themselves may be range dependent or change over time. S. Bonder [5] , [6] has developed explicit formulas for relating the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient to weapons system performance characteristics such as those mentioned above.
Thus, it seems appropriate to examine idealized combat situations in which the attrition-rate coefficients are time dependent. Moreover, this is facilitated by the author's research results on solutions to variable-coefficient Lanchester-type equations for "square-law" attrition processes [22] , [27] .
A key result is that there is a class of variable-coefficient Lanchester-type equations (combat between two homogeneous forces when the attrition-rate coefficents are variable provided that their ratio is constant) which possess a solution no more complicated than the solution to the constant coefficient case [El. This type of property (reflecting the physical situation in which two weapon systems cause attrition in a proportional fashion at all times) will now be exploited in an optimal control problem.
Thus, Problem 4 is a prescribed duration battle and is stated in mathematical terms below. 
bl ( t ) / h ( t )
= bl ( t = T ) / & ( t = T) , the optimal control law takes a particularly simple form In this instance target selection depends only on the product of attrition-rate coefficients which may be interpreted as the rate of destruction of enemy kill-rate capability. All fire is concentrated on one of the target types depending on which target type has the larger product of attrition-rate coefficients. Target priority is subject to change over time as the ranking of thz target types on this decision criterion changes. It is conceivable that the optimal tactic may be to shift fire from one target type to the other several times over the course of battle with the duration of battle not having any effect. Observe that no assumptions at all have been made on the Y-force attrition rates against XI and XZ, i.e., a1 ( t ) and uZ(t).
It i i now further assumed that a l ( t ) = k a , h ( t ) and aZ(t)=ka,h(t).
This means that not only is the ratio of the X-force weapon system attrition rates against the Y-force constant, but also the ratio of the Y-force effectiveness against each of the two X-force types. Furthermore, all four attrition-rate coefficients have the same time dependence except for constant factors. The solution is shown in Table IV . In this special case it is seen that the structure of the optimal allocation policies when the attrition-rate coefficients are variable is essentially identical to that in which they are constant. Only the time scale has been transformed (in [22] this type of observation was first made by the author (see also [25) ).
The development of the above results is omitted due to considerations of the length of the paper at hand. Their development and that of further such results are to be found in [ZB]. Moreover, it has been important to include the above results here, since the purpose of the paper at hand is to contrast the solutions for a sequence of related problems.
Finally, it should be noted that when h ( t ) = 1 the results of Table IV reduce to those for Problem 1 given in Table 11 . To see this one sets h ( t ) = 1 and makes the following identifications: k,, in Problem 4 is replaced by al in Problem 1, ko, by a2, kb, by b~, and ka, by bz. 
Fire Distribution for Targete Undergoing "Linear-Law" Attrition
So far in the state equations describing combat the attrition rate of each X-force target type has been proportional to only the number of Y-force firers. Considering Equations [7] , [9] , and [30] which give rise to the classical Lanchester square law, this may be referred to (somewhat imprecisely) as a square-law" attrition process of target types.* H. Weiss [30] has given a thorough discussion of the conditions which lead to such an attrition process. These conditions include that "each unit is informed about the location of the remaining opposing units so that when a target is destroyed, fire may be immediately shifted to a new target." It is thus noted that the control theory models which we have considered so far have implicitly assumed perfect information in the above sense.
Another model for target type attrition is one in which the attrition rate (of each X-force target type) is proportional to the product of the numbers of targets and firers. This may be referred to (again somewhat imprecisely) as a "linear-law" attrition process of target types. Such an attrition process can arise under two different general circumstances: (1) fire is uniformly distributed over a constant target area ("area fire"), or (2) the mean time of target acquisition is much larger than target destruction time and is inversely proportional to target density. Again, quoting Weiss [30] , it is assumed that units are informed about the general areas in which opposing units are located, but are not informed about the consequences of their own fire. Brackney [7] has shown that "aimed fire" may lead to a linear-law attrition process of targets when target acquisition times are considered and are as postulated above.
Thus, Problem 5 is a battle in which the attrition of each X-force target type is a linear-law process and is stated in mathematical terms below. The analysis details upon which the summary given below is based are given in a companion paper [29] (see also pp. 91-105 of [21]) due to their rather lengthy nature. Moreover, it is important that these results be given here so that one can see the effect of the combat attrition model on the structure of the optimal allocation policy by contrasting, for example, the solution to Problem 1 with that for Problem 5.
*The reader should keep in mind that the Y-forces are faced with the problem of determining the optimal distribution of fire over X-force target types.
Description of Optimal Fire Distribution Policy
There is a fundamental difference between the solution to Problem 5 and those considered previously: the optimal allocation, 4*, may be other than 0 or 1. In contrast to those for Problems 1 through 4, the optimal allocation policy does not have to be an extreme point of the control variable space at all times: one may have a singular solution [15] for which the necessary condition of maximizing the Hamiltonian (with respect to the control variable) does not provide a well-defined expression for the extremal control. That part of an optimal trajectory on which the maximum principle does not determine the control is called a singular subarc, and the term "singular solution" will be used to refer to any optimal trajectory which contains one or more singular subarcs.
Singular solutions usually occur when the Hamiltonian (denoted as H) is a linear function of the control variable(s). According to the notational conventions adopted in this paper, when this happens, then if -= 0 for a finite interval of time, the maximum principle does not determine the control
Observe that when -aH --0 and H is a linear function of 4, all feasible values of I #J are optimal All problems, however, for which the Hamiltonian is a linear function of the control variables do not have singular subarcs in their solution. In particular, the reader should note that it has been shown above that it is impossible to have a singular solution to Problem 1 through Problem 4. This was done, for aH = o for a finite interval of time example, for Problem 4 by showing that it is impossible forwhen -= 0. Moreover, there is a special second order necessary condition of local optimality (generalized Legendre-Cle$sch condition) [16] which must be satisfied in order that a singular subarc can yield a maximum return. This is satisfied for the problem at hand [29] .
The optimal battle trajectories are constructed by working backwards from all possible end points of this idealized battle [29] . Consideration is given to both the optimal control at the end of battle and also how the variables upon which it depends vary over time. Based upon such considerations, there are three cases to be considered:
Consider Case (a) first. The solution for this case is shown in Figure 2 . Even though explicit expressions have not been obtained for certain model parameters, the dependence of the optimal control upon these quantities can still be qualitatively discussed. The optimal control depends on the state variables x1 and x2 (and also the attrition coefficients) in each "decision region." Above the line alblxl=u263.22, denoted as L, the optimal control +* = 0 is used until this line is encountered. When L is reached the singular control 4* = -, which keeps the trajectory on L, is used until the end of the battle at t = T.
That portion of an optimal trajectory which lies on L (for a finite interval of time) is a singular subarc. The Thus for any optimal trajectory which lies below L' (such as those denoted in Figure 3 as (2), (3) . and (4)) the optimal control is +*= 1 during Phase 11. Moreover, the time ti= T-71 appears in Figure 3 , for example, as when the optimal control for (3) switches from + * = a 2 / ( a l + a2) to +*= 1. Any optimal trajectory which lies entirely above L' , such as (l), has a corresponding optimal control of +* ( t ) = 0 for 0 S t S T, whereas 2 similar remark holds for any one that lies entirely below L, such as (5). Case (c) is symmetric to Case (b). As noted above (see sections 3.1.2. and 3.3.1.)* the structure of the optimal allocation policies in these tactical allocation problems is dependent upon how the Y-force values the surviving X-force types relative to their kill rate against the Y-force. Case (a): -=-above is when Y assigns utility to surviving X-force types in exact proportion to their destructive capability against Y. In this case, the optimal target selection tactic depends only upon the state of the system as is seen with reference to Figure 2 . The optimal tactic is to use +*( t ) = 0 above the line L with equation alblxl = a262x2. The line L also represents an "equilibrium" trajectory which the system follows whenever this line is reached. Case (b):
' > -is when y assigns a greater value to surviving XI'S than in proportion to their kill rate against y relative to that of X 2 . Again, the optimal tactic depends upon the state of the system, only this dependence itself depends upon the "time phase" of the fixed length battle.
Based on the above examination of Problem 5, it is seen that the structure of the optimal allocation policies for targets which undergo a linear-law attrition process has the following characteristics:
(1) fire may be divided between target types, (2) the allocation is (directly) dependent upon the force levels.
These characteristics should be contrasted with those previously observed when target types undergo a square-law attrition process (see sections 3. 1.2. and 3.3.3.) . When there is a linear-law attrition process of target types, the optimal allocation policy may be other than 0 or 1. Also, the allocation depends upon the force levels of target types. An explanation for this structure of optimal allocation policies in terms of the nature of the attrition process has been given in section 3.1.2.
EXTENSIONS TO DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
Even though it is certainly true that combat is an environment of conflicting interests in which the potential actions of both friendly and enemy forces must be considered, there is much to be learned from one-sided dynamic optimization models. The author views these simplified idealizations presented here as "building blocks" for more sophisticated scenarios. It is felt, moreover, that an understanding of the structure of optimal tactics for these initial models is essential before one continues his examination of a sequence of models of greater and greater complexity. Hence, it seems appropriate to review the intimate connection between optimal control theory and differential games.
It has been stated that optimal control problems may be viewed as one-sided differential games for which the roles of all but one of the competing players have been suppressed [2] . Conversely, differential games may be viewed as two-sided optimal control problems [12] . A concise discussion of the interrelationships between these two subjects is contained in Y. C. Ho It should be recalled (see [24] ) that the existing theory of (zero-sum deterministic) differential games is only applicable to problems for which the criterion functional has a saddle point in pure strategies. However, it may be shown (considering the results of A. Friedman The author has therefore, used these optimal control problems to study many aspects of such corresponding differential games (two-sided variational problems): the effect of different boundary conditions, devising solution procedures, study of singular behavior, differences in the structure of optimal allocation policies for various model forms. 
IMPLICATIONS OF MODELS
It seems appropriate to briefly discuss the general implications of the models examined in this (1) optimal tactical allocation, (2) intelligence, (3) command and control systems, (4) human decision making. The discussion of these areas is not mutually exclusive.
Of interest to the military tactician is whether optimal fire distribution rules evolve dynamically during the course of battle. Are target priorities static or do they evolve dynamically with the course of battle? With respect to optimal control models, this may be mathematically stated as whether there are transition (switching) surfaces in the solution. It has been seen in the idealized and simplified models studied here that target priorities do change. This is related to the evolution of marginal return of target destruction (value of dual variable). It has been seen that this evolution depends on the goals of the combatants (utility assigned to surviving force types at the end of the battle) and also the conditions which terminate the battle. In the terminal control problem studied here, a shift in target priorities is present only in a losing case, whereas in a fixed duration battle such a switch is sometimes independent of winning or losing and then depends only on weapon system capabilities and the prescribed duration of battle.
Schreiber [20] has proposed an idealized and simple, but yet illuminating, way of quantitatively showing the value of intelligence and command control capabilities. He introduces the concept of "command efficiency,'' which is measured by the fraction of the enemy's destroyed units from which fire has been redirected. The effect of poor intelligence and poor capabilities for redirecting fire from paper to the following areas:
destroyed targets is to produce "overkill." Schreiber's equations for combat involved this fraction called command efficiency," and they reduce to Lanchester-type equations for area fire when the fraction is 0 and aimed fire for a value of 1. It has been seen that the optimal tactics are quite different for these two cases. When intelligence and command control systems are very efficient, the optimal tactic is seen always to be concentration of fire on a specific target type. When capability for redirection of fire from destroyed targets is poor (either through damage assessment or constraints on new target acquisition), the optimal tactic may be to allocate fire in a proportional fashion over target types in a way that holds the ratios of target density in each target area to be constant. Thus, these models indicate that the optimal tactics of fire distribution vary with command and control capabilities.
These models also show the importance of intelligence in devising the "best" tactics in combat. Intelligence on enemy weapon system capabilities (kill rates including target acquisition rates) and potential length of engagement play a central part. It has also been seen that for fights-to-the-finish and linear-law attrition cases intelligence on enemy force levels is also required. For artillery fire support missions against various troop concentrations, knowledge of troop densities is essential in the assignment of target priorities. Particularly dense concentrations where the initial kill potential is high are seen to be cases where the optimal tactic is to concentrate fire on one target for awhile.
These models may be interpreted to show the value of human judgment in combat. They indicate, as does common sense and experience, that in battle a commander must use his judgment to ascertain to what end can the course of battle be steered so that he may devise his strategy accordingly. The demonstrated sensitivity of these models to many factors shows the importance of human assessment of a situation and the importance of good judgment in assigning utility to forces surviving the battle at hand.
SUMMARY

L L
The results of this paper may be summarized as follows:
(1) a sequence of one-sided models has been presented which shows that the tactics of fire distribution are sensitive to force levels, target acquisition process, the type of attrition process, and the termination conditions of combat, (2) tactics for target selection are heavily dependent upon "command efficiency," (3) concentration of fire always on one target type among many occurs as an optimal tactic (4) target priorities do not change over time when one assigns a worth to surviving target types only when target acquisition is not subject to diminishing returns, in direct proportion to their kill rate against you.
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